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interest groups’ incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision
of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature. We show that
the eﬀectiveness of lobbying lies in changing the viable policy coalitions. We show
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1 Introduction
The extension of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China in 2000 was hailed
as a major political victory for the second Clinton administration. Despite heightened
partisanship in Congress during that period, the coalition that supported and passed
the bill in the House of Representative exhibited substantial partisan overlap: three-
quarters of the Republicans and one-third of the Democrats in the House voted for the
bill, and it was clear that without the support from a substantial number of Democrats
the bill would not have passed.
By all accounts, lobbying for and against the bill and for various provisions within
it was very intense.1 Most likely, many legislators learned about the consequences of
PNTR for their district and about certain details in the bill from an interest group
that favored or opposed the China Trade bill for reasons quite independent of the ones
shared with the legislator.
This example is far from unique. It is commonplace for policy entrepreneur to craft
a legislative coalition in the U.S. Congress “opportunistically” so as to achieve their
objective. By addressing a range of interests the sponsor can attract the support from
members of the other party with very little sanctions from her own party nor for the
supporters, unless the issue hits a partisan “nerve.” In fact, many bills are jointly
sponsored by members of both parties, underscoring the opportunistic nature of policy
coalitions.
Likewise, interest groups that provide assessments of and recommendations for the
design of legislation common, too. With hearings and open access, Congress is deftly
prepared to collect information from a wide set of interests and permits interest groups
1Congressional Quarterly Weekly 58(16). 15 April 2000, p. 909.
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to weigh in on the policy debate. We need not assume that legislators are corruptible,
gullible, or naive in order for information to make a diﬀerence in policy outcomes.
Members, for their own beneﬁt, pay heed to the information brought before them by
interest groups and lobbyists. With time at a premium, information is welcome and
can quickly be parsed for relevant and useful content.
The question is whether the openness to outside information and the ﬂexibility
with which policy coalitions are formed is a feature of Congress alone or whether it is
common among the legislatures around the world. While this is an empirical question,
we propose here a formal model that provides a theoretical answer. Casual empirical
evidence, however, points in the same direction as our theoretical results: Congress is
quite unique in these features.
Others have pointed out that party strength and the cohesion among members of a
government coalition in parliamentary systems tend to exceed that of the two parties
in the U.S. Congress (Mezey 1979; Loewenberg and Patterson 1988). At the same
time, the legislative process in parliamentary democracies is by far not as open to a
broad range of interest groups. Legislative committee hearings are much rarer and less
expansive, and fewer interest groups bother to contact legislators (Liebert 1995, von
Beyme 1998). Legislators seem to rely for their information to a greater extent on
governmental sources outside the legislature, including the administration and state
governments, and on a narrow set of well-entrenched constituencies.
In this paper we focus on the incentives the legislative organization provides for
interest groups to lobby in the legislative process. Lobbying as information provision
has been studied in the literature (Calvert 1985; Austen-Smith 1998; de Figueiredo,
Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999; Bennedsen and Feldmann 2001). In the present analysis
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we show that the willingness of interest groups to strategically provide information
in order to obtain more favorable outcomes depends, inter alia, on the structure of
the decision making institutions. The lobbying eﬀort is contingent on the legislative
organization. It turns out that, in accordance with Mayhew (1974), the organization
of Congress is particularly apt to serve the—informational—needs of its members.
Huber (1996) shows that the vote of conﬁdence procedure is a salient institutional
feature of a parliamentary system. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) formalize the
role of the vote of conﬁdence procedure in creating cohesion within the governing
coalition in a dynamic, multi-period model. We adopt their model here in a simpliﬁed
fashion to study informational lobbying in a comparative context. In Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2002) we show that if government membership creates a positive rent, then
the conﬁdence procedure tends to reduce informational lobbying. In the present paper
we extend that analysis into a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and compare
the incentive to lobby a Congressional system (CS) without conﬁdence procedure and
a parliamentary system (PS) that provides the conﬁdence procedure.
2 The Model
The Legislature
Consider a legislature composed of three legislators, i, each representing a district.
The legislature meets for a term of T policy periods, after which it faces mandatory
reelection.2 The session begins with an organizational period in which the government
coalition is formed. The subsequent periods are policy periods, during which a member
2For convenience we number periods in reverse order, i.e., the last policy period is period 1 and
the ﬁrst period is period T .
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of the government coalition is (randomly) selected to make a policy proposal.3 The
proposal is voted on by majority rule, and the next period begins.
The diﬀerence between the Congressional and the parliamentary systems lies in
the consequence of a failed vote. In the congressional system, when a policy proposal
fails, then no policy is adopted and the legislature moves to the next policy period.
The parliamentary system, on the other hand, allows the conﬁdence procedure to be
invoked: when the procedure has been invoked and the proposed policy proposal fails,
then the government steps down and a new government is formed. The fate of the
government coalition is thus tied to the outcome of the vote on the proposal.
Since we are not interested in the government formation process per se, we simply
assume that the government is formed by a random draw of two (of the three) members
by Nature.
The Policy Process and Lobbying
Within each policy period τ , the legislature decides on the allocation of a distributive
policy, i.e., on the distribution of local public goods to the three districts.4 Let Gτ be
the total amount of public goods to be distributed in period τ , and gτ = (gτ1 , g
τ
2 , g
τ
3 ) the
vector of the allocation such that Gτ =
∑3
i=1 g
τ
i . The dead-weight loss of government
spending is assumed to be increasing, so that the cost of providing gτ is convex in the
total distribution; we assume a simple cost function C(gτ ) = 1
2
(Gτ )2. We assume that
there is a balanced budget within each period and that costs are shared equally among
the districts through lump sum taxation, such that each district’s tax burden in period
3The structure of this policy game is similar to Diermeier and Feddersen (1998). In the Congres-
sional system the “government coalition” is simply the Congressional majority.
4See Baron (1994) for a discussion of distributive policies.
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τ is 1
6
(Gτ )2. The net beneﬁt to district i from allocation gτ in period τ is given by
ui(g
τ ) = θi g
τ
i − 16(Gτ )2, (1)
where θi is the district’s (marginal) valuation of the public good.
Districts can be of two types, θi ∈ {θ, θ}, with 0 < θ < θ. The distribution of type
is such that θi = θ with probability p and θi = θ with probability (1 − p), ex ante.
We assume that the θi’s are uncorrelated across districts and across policy rounds (i.e.,
each period deals with a diﬀerent distributional policy). In any decision a legislator
i faces, she seeks to maximize the expected sum of beneﬁts accruing to her district
during the remainder of the legislative session,
∑τ
j=1 E[ui(g
j)].
Lobbying is the strategic transmission of decision-relevant information to members
of the legislature. The uncertainty legislators face in this model is the value each
district derives from the local public good. By providing information about districts’
valuation of the public good, a lobby group can potentially aﬀect the allocation of the
public good to the districts.
Suppose in each period τ a lobby group, e.g., the producer or the national represen-
tative for the beneﬁciaries of the public good, is interested in increasing the aggregate
amount of the policy that is being allocated. The group can search, i.e., it can obtain
a signal about a district’s valuation, and then decide whether it wants to reveal this
information to the decision makers. We assume that the search activity is costless for
the lobby group and observable by the legislature.5
When the interest group searches for information about district i’s valuation, it
5The assumption that search is costless can easily be relaxed. We deal extensively with unobserv-
able search in Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) and show there that the basic logic of what follows
carries through.
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receives a signal σi, which with probability q reveals the district’s true type, σi = θi,
and with probability 1 − q is uninformative, σi = ∅. After the proposer is chosen
from the government coalition, the interest group lobbies the legislature by sending a
vector of messages µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3),
6 where µi ∈ {σi, ∅}. In other words, this model
of informational lobbying assumes that information is “hard” evidence, i.e., the group
can transmit or withhold evidence, but it cannot “lie” by forging information. Once
the message is sent, the proposer chooses a policy allocation gτ , and the legislature
votes on the proposal via majority rule.
In summary, the sequence of moves within each policy period is:
1. The lobby group decides upon its search activity.
2. Nature chooses a proposer randomly from the government coalition.
3. The lobby group delivers its message to the legislature.
4. Proposer chooses a policy allocation. In the PS, the proposer also decides upon
the use of the conﬁdence procedure.
5. The legislature votes on the proposal. If the proposal is rejected, the allocation
to each district is zero. In the PS, if the conﬁdence procedure has been invoked,
losing the vote also forces the government to step down and a new government
coalition is drawn by Nature for the next policy period.
In step 2 above, Nature designates one of the two legislators in the government
coalition as the proposer (or agenda setter), and the other as coalition partner. The
third legislator, who is not a member of the governing coalition, remains the minority
6The message vector is sent to all legislators simultaneously. This is without loss of generality since
the lobby group’s optimal strategy is to reveal high values of θ only even if messages were privately
sent to individual legislators.
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legislator. We will thus refer to the three legislators (and the three districts) using
the subscripts as, cp, and mi. In any given policy period the proposer may choose to
include the coalition partner and/or the minority legislator in a policy coalition.
Finally, in step 5, we make the assumption, which is standard in setter games, that
when a legislator is indiﬀerent between voting for the proposal or against it she resolves
the indiﬀerence by voting for the proposal.
3 Results
We solve for the optimal strategies in this game by backward induction. Our equilib-
rium concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. One characteristic feature of the
Congressional legislative system is that it does not have a vote of conﬁdence procedure,
i.e., even if the government, or majority party, looses important votes, it does not step
down. In fact, this happens quite frequently. We focus on showing what the optimal
lobbying strategy is for the lobby group and we use this as a benchmark against which
we in the next section measure the lobby’s incentive to engage in information provision
in the presence of a vote of conﬁdence procedure. However, before we can analyze the
lobby’s value from searching for information, we need to know what the aggregate level
of public good for given expectations of districts’ marginal beneﬁt will be, i.e. we need
to know what G the agenda setter optimally proposes.
Informational Lobbying in the Last Period
Let us start by considering the last policy period of the legislative term. After this
period the government must step down, which renders the conﬁdence procedure in-
nocuous since all it can do is force the government to step down if the proposal is
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rejected. The Congressional and the parliamentary systems are thus equivalent in this
case.
The agenda setter optimally proposes an allocation of the public goods that max-
imizes the net beneﬁts to his district subject to the condition that the proposed al-
location will be supported by a majority of the legislators, i.e., by at least one other
legislator. Since for any total allocation G a second legislator’s participation constraint
is easier to satisfy the higher her valuation of the public good is, the agenda setter will
include the legislator as partner in the policy coalition whose expected valuation Eθj
is higher, and allocate suﬃcient public goods to the partner’s district so that her par-
ticipation constraint is met. The remaining legislator receives an allocation of zero.
(If the other two legislators have the same expected marginal utility, the agenda setter
picks randomly one of them as her policy coalition partner.)
Solving this constrained maximization problem is straightforward and yields the
following aggregate level of public good:
G∗ = 3
Eθas · Eθj
Eθas + Eθj
, (2)
with j = arg max
i∈{cp,mi}
Eθi.
The aggregate allocation of public good is thus an increasing and strictly concave
function of the the expected marginal beneﬁts for each of the two policy coalition
partners. Since we are interested in the lobby group’s behavior, and the lobby by
assumption only cares about the aggregate amount of public good, we do not need
to state the actual allocation of public good to each region. We deﬁne G∗(·,·) as a
function with two arguments given in (2).
We can now analyze the group’s search and information transmission behavior
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in period 1. We will show that, given the agenda’s best response function G∗, the
interest group has a unique best lobbying strategy. By searching in a district, the
group may be able to reveal that the district’s valuation is high, or it may not be
able to convey positive information, in which case the agenda setter updates his belief
about the district’s valuation. As a matter of notation, let E(θi|no search in i) = θ◦
be the ex ante expectation of the district’s type given the prior distribution θi, and let
E(θi|unsuccessful search in i) = θs be the posterior expectation of θi after the interest
group searched for information in district i and did not reveal any positive ﬁnding.7
The interest group needs to choose in which districts to search so as to raise the
expected valuations in the policy coalition. In the last policy period the lobby strictly
prefers to search for information. This is easily seen by considering a search in the
minority district only: With probability pq the lobby ﬁnds evidence for θmi = θ, which
implies that the proposer would choose the minority district as a majority partner. If
the lobby does not ﬁnd this positive evidence, the proposer lowers his expectation about
the minority district’s valuation of the public good and will choose the cp as partner in
the policy coalition, and the aggregate good will be as high as if the interest group had
not searched. The interest group’s expected value of searching in the minority district
relative to not searching is
Vmi = pq
[
G∗(θ◦, θ) −G∗(θ◦, θ◦)] > 0.
The following lemma veriﬁes that this is indeed the group’s optimal search strategy by
calculating the corresponding values for all search strategies.
7Naturally, θ◦i = (1 − p) θ + p θ. An unsuccessful search from the interest group’s point of view
comprises the events σi = θ or σi = ∅. The interest group always transmits a favorable signal and
withholds an unfavorable one so that, using Bayes’ Rule, we have θsi =
1−p
1−pq θ +
p−pq
1−pq θ. Note that
θsi < θ
◦
i .
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Lemma 1. In the last policy period the interest group’s unique optimal search strategy,
in both legislative systems, is to search in the minority district alone.
Proof. We have already argued that in the last policy period the conﬁdence procedure
has no eﬀect on the behavior of the legislators. Thus, the interest group’s optimal
search strategy will be the same in both legislative systems. It remains to show what
this strategy is.
Since the group does not know at the time of searching which member of govern-
ment will be selected as the agenda setter, there are ﬁve distinct search strategies.
Analogous to Vmi above we calculate the net gain for each of these remaining search
strategies: Vgv (search in one government member’s district), Vgv,gv (search in both
government members’ districts), Vgv,mi (search in one government member’s district
and the minority legislator’s district), and Vgv,gv,mi (search in all three districts).
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Vgv =
1
2
[pq G∗(θ, θ◦) + (1− pq)G∗(θs, θ◦)]
+ 1
2
[pq G∗(θ, θ◦) + (1− pq)G∗(θ◦, θ◦)] −G∗(θ◦, θ◦) < Vmi,
Vgv,mi =
1
2
{
(pq)2G∗(θ, θ) + pq(1 − pq)[G∗(θs, θ) + G∗(θ, θ◦)] + (1− pq)2G∗(θs, θ◦)}
+ 1
2
[
(2pq − pq2)G∗(θ, θ◦) + (1− pq)2G∗(θ◦, θs)]−G∗(θ◦, θ◦)
< 1
2
[
pq G∗(θ◦, θ) + (1− pq)G∗(θ◦, θ◦)]
+ 1
2
[
pq G∗(θ, θ◦) + (1− pq)G∗(θ◦, θ◦)]−G∗(θ◦, θ◦) = Vmi,
Vgv,gv = (pq)
2G∗(θ, θ) + pq(1 − pq) [G∗(θ, θ◦) + G∗(θ, θs)]
+ (1− pq)2G∗(θs, θ◦) −G∗(θ◦, θ◦)
< pq G∗(θ, θ◦) + (1− pq)G∗(θ◦, θ◦) −G∗(θ◦, θ◦) = Vmi.
Vgv,gv,mi = pq
[
(2pq − pq2)G∗(θ, θ) + (1− pq)2G∗(θ, θs)]
+ (1− pq) [(2pq − pq2)G∗(θs, θ) + (1− pq)2G∗(θs, θs)]−G∗(θ◦, θ◦)
< pq
[
pq G∗(θ, θ) + (1− pq)G∗(θ, θ◦)] +
(1 − pq) [pq G∗(θs, θ) + (1− pq)G∗(θs, θ◦)]−G∗(θ◦, θ◦)
< pq G∗(θ◦, θ) + (1− pq)G∗(θ◦, θ◦) −G∗(θ◦, θ◦) = Vmi.
Each inequality above follows from Jensen’s inequality and the fact that the agenda
setter’s response function G∗(·) is strictly concave. Thus, Vmi maximizes the expected
allocation of public good.
We have now shown that in the last policy period of the legislative term, Congres-
sional system and parliamentary system provide the exact same incentive to lobby. In
particular, the interest group collects information about a “marginal” district, one that
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would not otherwise be included in the policy coalition, and manages to change both
the composition of the policy coalition as well as the allocation of policy so that the
overall outcome is in its favor.
Lobbying in Absence of the Conﬁdence Vote Procedure
In this section we work our way backwards for the game without the vote of conﬁdence
procedure. A legislator in period τ maximizes her expected future beneﬁts over the
remainder of the legislative term, i.e.,
Ui =
τ∑
j=1
E[ui(g
j)].
We denote by vτi =
∑τ−1
j=1 E[ui(g
j)] the continuation value of the game in period τ .
Hence the legislator is maximizing
Ui = ri g
τ
i − 16(Gτ )2 + vτi . (3)
We will show below that vτi is identical for the two members of the governing coalition,
and we will refer to it as vτgov; the continuation value for the minority legislator is
strictly lower. The “value” of being in the government coalition in period τ is therefore
δτgov ≡ vτgov − vτmi. This value will play a central role in a legislature with a vote of
conﬁdence procedure.
In the absence of the conﬁdence procedure there is no strategic link between the
policy periods. To see this, consider the voting decision by a non-proposing legislator i
facing a proposal gτ at date τ . She supports the proposal if and only if her utility from
the proposal plus the continuation value vτi of future policy periods is greater than her
utility from an allocation gτ ′i = 0 with no tax cost, plus v
τ
i . Thus, v
τ
i does not aﬀect
the legislator’s voting decision. Furthermore, since the utility function is additively
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separable, vτas does not aﬀect the agenda setter’s own utility from a given proposal (see
(3)). Finally, gτ does not aﬀect the expected value of future policy periods since, by
assumption, the budget is balanced within each period.8 The interest group in period
τ also faces no strategic consideration as it only operates in this period.
The absence of a strategic link between the policy periods implies that each period
in the legislative game without conﬁdence procedure is strategically equivalent to the
last period. We can therefore state the following Lemma without proof:
Lemma 2. In the dynamic policy game without vote of conﬁdence procedure (con-
gressional system), in each policy period τ the interest group’s unique optimal search
strategy is to search in the minority district alone.
The solution to our legislative game without vote of conﬁdence procedure can be
summarized as follows. First, Nature draws the government coalition. Then in each
policy period the active lobby group searches for information in the minority district.
If the lobby ﬁnds positive information about a high marginal valuation of the public
good in the minority district, it transmits this information to the legislature. If the
lobby delivers evidence for high valuation, the proposer reaches beyond the governing
coalition (majority) and picks the outside district as a policy partner to support the
current policy, with no repercussion for the future of the governing coalition. In case
of no evidence from the lobby or evidence of low valuation, the proposer picks her
government partner as the policy partner.9 The agenda setter proposes an aggregate
8In addition, inter-period reciprocal arrangements between legislators cannot be sustained since
they would break down in the last period and thus unravel by backward induction.
9In the established equilibrium the lobby may also deliver information about low marginal valua-
tion, since the minority district is excluded from the policy majority as long as there is no positive
evidence for high valuation.
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amount of public good given in (2) and distributes it such that the non-policy partner
receives zero public good, the policy partner receives suﬃcient amount of public good
to weakly support the proposal, and the agenda setter receives the rest.
Lobbying and the Role of the Conﬁdence Vote
The ability to link a policy proposal to a conﬁdence vote creates a truly dynamic model
with strategic interdependence across policy periods. To see this, consider the govern-
ment coalition partner’s (pc) evaluation of a given policy proposal to which a conﬁdence
vote is attached. If he supports the proposal he will still be in the government coalition
in the next period, which has a positive value to him. If he rejects the policy proposal
and the proposal fails, the government steps down, and with a probability of 2/3 he
will participate in the next government (this is identical for all i). In other words, he
expects to lose 1
3
δτgov by causing the proposal to fail. Hence, cp’s voting decision in
period τ is aﬀected by the size of δτgov, which depends on the payoﬀs of future periods
(except when τ =1, the last period before mandatory election).
We now ﬁnd equilibrium behavior in the dynamic model with conﬁdence vote by
solving the game backwards from period 1. In particular, we need to determine how
the vτi develop over time.
In Proposition 1 below we state, that when the proposer can link its policy proposal
to a vote of conﬁdence and there are suﬃciently many policy periods remaining, then a
lobby has less incentive to search than without the conﬁdence procedure. In particular,
we show that the lobby does not gain from using the search strategy that is optimal in
the congressional system. Hence, the expected gain from searching, and thus the lobby’s
incentive to search, is strictly smaller (possible negative) than in the congressional
system.
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Date 1: The continuation value in period 1, v1i , is normalized to zero for all
legislators as the government needs to step down for sure at the end of the period. By
Lemma 1, the lobby group’s unique optimal search strategy is to search in the minority
district and to report any positive ﬁnding. The proposer chooses as policy partner the
one with the highest expected θi. The expected utility in period 1 for the agenda setter,
u1as, the coalition partner, u
1
cp, and the minority legislator, u
1
mi, are
u1as = pq ψas(θ
◦, θ) + (1− pq)ψas(θ◦, θ◦)
u1cp = −pq3 G∗(θ◦, θ)2 (4)
u1mi = −1−pq3 G∗(θ◦, θ◦)2
ψas(θas, θj) = uas(g
∗) is the agenda setter’s utility from the optimal policy alloca-
tion, which depends, like G∗, on the districts’ valuations of the public good. It is easy
to show that ψas(θas, θj) =
3
2
θ2asθj
θas+θj
.
Inspecting (4) we observe that the coalition partner’s expected beneﬁts is her ex-
pected tax share whenever the lobby group does ﬁnd evidence for high valuation in the
minority district, since she receive a zero expected beneﬁt whenever she is included in
the policy coalition. The expected beneﬁt for the minority district is, similarly, the ex-
pected tax share times the probability of not being included in the policy coalition. In
the last policy period (period 1) the proposer has no incentive to attach the conﬁdence
vote.
Date τ > 1: The continuation value vτgov for the members of the governing coali-
tion arises from the likelihood of being the proposer in the next period. If the govern-
ment remains in power at date τ , each of the two legislators in the governing coalition
has probability 1/2 of being the proposer at date τ − 1. This probability drops to 1/3
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if the government is dissolved and newly formed.
In period τ the lobby group has the highest incentive to engage in information
provision when the search strategy identiﬁed in Lemma 1 (i.e., searching in district
mi) such that the proposer is willing to change the majority composition in response
to the message received from the lobby group. Assume this is the case for all subsequent
periods 1 through (τ − 1). The following Lemma describes the laws of motion for the
continuation value vτgov and the expected utilities, for any period τ .
Lemma 3. Suppose in each period 1, . . . , τ the lobby searches in the minority district
only and that the proposer includes the minority district in the policy coalition if and
only if the lobby provides positive evidence for θmi = θ. Then for τ > 1,
vτgov = h(τ)(u
1
as + u
1
cp) − k(τ)u1mi,
uτas = [1 + (2− pq)h(τ)]u1as + (2− pq)h(τ)u1cp − (2 − pq)k(τ)u1mi, (5)
uτcp = pq h(τ)u
1
as + [1 + pq h(τ)]u
1
cp − pq k(τ)u1mi,
uτmi = τ u
1
mi,
where
h(τ) ≡ 1
2
τ−1∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i
and k(τ) ≡
τ−1∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i
(τ − i).
Proof. The proof is by induction.
Date 2. The continuation value for each member of the governing coalition is
v2gov =
1
6
(u1as + u
1
cp) − 13u1mi = h(2)(u1as + u1cp) − k(2)u1mi.
By assumption the lobby searches only in the minority district and the proposer is
willing to include this district in a policy majority if µmi = θ. Thus, with probability
pq the proposer picks mi as a policy coalition partner without invoking the conﬁdence
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procedure. With probability 1 − pq the proposer uses cp to support the policy and
extracts the rent (continuation value) by attaching a conﬁdence vote. Whichever leg-
islator is picked as policy partner receives reservation utility zero. Thus, the expected
utilities for the proposer, the coalition partner and the minority legislator are,
u2as = u
1
as + (2− pq)v2gov
= [1 + (2− pq)h(2)]u1as + (2− pq)h(2)u1cp − (2 − pq)k(2)u1mi,
u2cp = u
1
cp + pqv
2
gov = pq h(2)u
1
as + [1 + pq h(2)]u
1
cp − pq k(2)u1mi,
u2mi = 2u
1
mi.
Date τ > 2. Assume the Lemma true for all number of periods up to τ − 1. The
continuation value for each coalition partner in period τ is,
vτgov =
1
6
(uτ−1as + u
τ−1
cp ) − 13uτ−1mi
= 1
6
(1 + 2 h(τ − 1)) (u1as + u1cp) −
(
1
3
k(τ − 1) + 1
3
(τ − 1)) u1mi
=
1
6
(
1 + 2
τ−2∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i )
(u1as + u
1
cp) −
(
1
3
τ−2∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i
(τ − 1 − i) + 1
3
(τ − 1)
)
u1mi
= h(τ)(u1as + u
1
cp) − k(τ)u1mi
Given vτgov the expected payoﬀs for the legislators are,
uτas = u
1
as + (2− pq)vτgov
= (1 + (2− pq)h(τ))u1as + (2− pq)h(τ)u1cp − (2 − pq)k(τ)u1mi,
uτcp = u
1
cp + pqv
τ
gov = pq h(τ)u
1
as + (1 + pq h(τ))u
1
cp − pq k(τ)u1mi,
uτmi = τ u
1
mi.
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Suppose now that the lobby in period τ provides positive evidence for a high valu-
ation in the minority district, µmi = θ. The proposer is willing to forego the beneﬁt of
the conﬁdence procedure if and only if,
ψas(θ
◦, θ) ≥ ψas(θ◦, θ◦) + vτgov. (6)
Since umi < 0, h(τ) is increasing and bounded, and k(τ) grows without bound, we
observe that vτgov increases without bound as τ increases; therefore the proposer will
always prefer using the conﬁdence procedure and require the support from the coalition
partner whenever τ is large enough. Let t¯ be the maximum τ for which (6) holds, and
deﬁne t∗ = min{t¯, T}. Thus, for τ ≤ t∗ the proposer is willing to craft the coalition
opportunistically when she receives information from the lobby group.
When τ > t∗, the proposer enforces voting cohesion among the government coali-
tion. Hence, the lobby may either choose another search strategy that is able to aﬀect
the composition of the majority or abstain from searching. In the former case, Lemma
1 proves these strategies have a lower expected gain for the lobby group. We thus
arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For all policy periods τ from T to t∗+ 1 an interest group’s expected
gain from searching and providing information is strictly smaller in the system with
conﬁdence procedure than in the system without the conﬁdence procedure. In the last
t∗ policy periods the two systems provide an interest group with the same expected gain
from lobbying.
The proposition states that for periods τ > t∗ incentive for an interest group to
engage in informational lobbying is strictly smaller in the parliamentary system than
it is in the Congressional system. The intuition behind this result can be provided
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in two steps: First, having a large number of policy periods remaining before the end
of the legislative term increases the value of belonging to the governing coalition. As
Diermeier and Feddersen have shown, this implies that the members of the governing
coalition have an incentive to support the proposals put forward by other members of
the governing coalition, so that the vote of conﬁdence procedure enhances voting cohe-
sion among coalition partners. Second, a national lobby group’s incentives to provide
information is based on its ability to inﬂuence the composition of the policy coalition,
and thereby to aﬀect policy choices. If the value of government membership is high
enough, and if the proposer is willing to invoke the conﬁdence procedure and enforce
voting cohesion, then there is little role for the interest group to aﬀect the composition
of the policy majority. Hence, the interest group’s incentive for informational lobbying
is diminished.
A second implication of Proposition 1 is that the activity of informational lobbying
in the parliamentary system should be increasing over the course of the legislative
term. The closer to the mandatory election date, the more impact will the transmitted
information have as it is increasingly likely to aﬀect the composition of the policy
coalition; at the same time, voting cohesion in the legislature should decline. In a
Congressional legislature our model predicts a constant, high level of informational
lobbying.
4 Examples
The relevance of the identiﬁed diﬀerence in relative incentives to engage in informa-
tional lobbying in the Congressional and a parliamentary systems depends on the size
of t∗. In this section we explore the range of parameters for which Proposition 1 is
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Figure 1: The number of periods for which the two legislative structures provide the
same incentives for lobby groups to engage in information gathering. Panel (a): p = 0.5
and q = 0.5; Panel (b): θ/θ = 2 and q = 0.5; and, Panel (c): θ/θ = 2 and p = 0.5.
most meaningful. We provide simulation results in Figures 1 and 2 below.
The model has essentially three parameters that determine the incentive for the
interest group to lobby: the probability of ﬁnding positive evidence, q, the ex ante
probability of high marginal utility in any district, p, and the relative variation in the
tastes across districts, θ/θ.
Figure 1 shows how the value of t∗ is aﬀected by the parameters of the model. Our
benchmark values are: θ/θ = 2, q = 1
2
, and, p = 1
2
. In the ﬁrst panel we vary θ/θ from
1 to 10. Using these parameters we solve equations (1) through (6) numerically, which
gives us an implied value of t∗, the maximum number of policy periods in which the
two legislative structures provide lobby groups with the same incentives to engage in
information gathering.
We observe that when the intensity of preference for the public good varies between
districts less than 400 percent, i.e. θ/θ < 4, t∗ is one. Hence, as long as the taste
variation across districts is not extreme it is only in the last policy period that the
two legislative structures provide the same incentives for lobby groups to engage in
information provision. For extreme values of taste variation, we observe no more than
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t∗ = 2 in the present example. In the two next panels, we ﬁx the taste variation at 2
and vary p and q. Notice that t∗ is not aﬀected by variation in q at all (for p = .5),
and only for small values of p is t∗ greater than one (at q = .5).
From the example presented in Figure 1 and other, non reported, simulations, it
appears that t∗ is small, and equal to one for a large range of plausible parameters.10
Thus, the lack of action in Figure 1 supports the main insight of our analysis: in
comparing multiple rounds of legislative bargaining in the parliamentary system with
multiple rounds of bargaining in the congressional system, the parliamentary system
provides a strictly lower incentives to engage in informational lobbying in most policy
periods.
For a small enough degree of taste variations between districts the result can be
stated in a stronger form. A suﬃcient condition for the interest group not to lobby at
all, except for in the last policy period is the following:
v1gov > ψas(θ, θ) − ψas(θ, θ) (7)
The right hand side of the inequality denotes the highest gain a proposer can ever
achieve from breaking the governing coalition. The expression then says that in the
penultimate period the value for the coalition partner of maintaining the government
coalition exceeds the gain the agenda setter may obtain by responding to informative
messages from the lobby group. If (7) holds, then the lobby can never aﬀect the policy
majority in any period except for the last and therefore has no incentive to engage in
information provision.
The shaded area in Figure 2 shows the range of parameters for which Equation 7 is
10Our simulations shows that only very small values of p combined with extreme values of θ/θ
induce a “high” t∗, i.e., t∗ higher than 5.
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Figure 2: The set of parameters for which a lobby confronting a parliamentary legisla-
ture chooses to abstain from information gathering.
satisﬁed for three diﬀerent degrees of taste diﬀerences. For parameters in this range no
lobby will engage in information provision in any policy period, except the ﬁnal period
before an election. The ﬁgure conﬁrms the importance of the diﬀerent incentive pro-
vided by the two diﬀerent legislative structures: When district speciﬁc taste diﬀerence
are relatively small, it is likely that lobby groups confronting a parliament will abstain
completely from engaging in informational lobbying.
Robustness.
In our dynamic framework of informational legislative lobbying we imposed a number
of simplifying assumptions. In this subsection we brieﬂy discuss the impact of relaxing
three of these assumptions on our comparative institutional analysis.
Our ﬁrst discussion concerns our simplifying assumption that information search is
observable by all players in our model. This clearly simpliﬁes the analysis and highlight
the working of the information externality, but it is not crucial for our result. In prac-
tice, legislators cannot be expected to monitor interest group activities all too closely.
However, if we maintain that players are rational and make the best (equilibrium) pre-
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dictions about other players’ unobserved behavior and that players’ actions are optimal
given their beliefs, then the main insight, that the parliamentary legislature provides
less incentive to engage in informational lobbying, survives introducing unobservable
information search. The main diﬀerence is that in the case of unobservable search, the
activity itself does not induce the proposer to revise her beliefs, so that the activity
itself does not impose a Bayesian cost. Instead, the proposer infers whether or not
the group has an incentive to search and forms her expectations accordingly. Thus, in
equilibrium the failure to report a positive ﬁnding still carries the Bayesian updating
cost.
In our model we assumed for analytical simplicity that the legislature only contained
three legislators. Extending the model to any - odd - number of legislators does not
aﬀect our main result. In the congressional setting, the value of engaging in information
search increases because there it is easier to have an impact on the composition of the
policy majority. On the other hand, when the value of government membership is
suﬃciently high, it is not possible to aﬀect policy composition in the parliamentary
system. Hence, the lobby has smaller incentives to lobby in latter system.
Finally, we assumed that the lobbies only care about the aggregate - national - level
of the public good. An interest group’s beneﬁt is often localized, and it may have a
particular knowledge of the local incidence of the public good that it might want to
convey to the legislators. In this case, they compete for inclusion of their district in
the majority by providing information. Our general result prevails and may even be
ampliﬁed, since this inclusion motive is absent in the parliamentary system.
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